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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LUIS PEREZ-LLAMAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20041084-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute in the presence of a person under 18, a second degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), -(4)(a)(x) (West 2004), in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Juab County, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding.1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is: 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence where the officer's search of defendant's van was supported by probable cause, 
exigent circumstances, and defendant's voluntary consent? 
1
 Citations are made to Utah Code Annotated (West 2004), although the offense 
was committed in October 2003. Although amendments to section 58-37-8 were made 
after the offense was committed and are reflected in the current Code, they are not 
relevant to this case. See 2005 Utah Laws pp. 182-85. 
The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings underlying its denial 
of a defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. 
Callahan, 2004 UT App 164, \ 5, 93 P.3d 103. "In contrast, we review 'the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions.'" State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, \ 10, 535 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 42 (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996)). "In addition, 
' [b]ecause this case involves a search and seizure, we do not extend any deference to the trial 
court in its application of the law to its factual findings.5" Id. (citing State v. Alverez, 2005 
UT App 145, K 8, 111 P.3d 808 (quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15, 103 P.3d 699)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provision and statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
Amendment IV to the United States Constitution; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-55 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute in the presence of a person under 18, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODEANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)&4(x)(West2004)(R. 1). Following a preliminary hearing, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied (R. 24-17, 73-69). Defendant then 
sought permission from this Court to file an interlocutory appeal, which was also denied (R. 
102-95, 105). Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional plea to the charged offense (R. 
202:8). The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years, which 
2 
it suspended, ordering that defendant serve 365 days in the Juab County Jail (R. 146; 203:19, 
21).2 
Following imposition of sentence, defendant filed an application for a certificate of 
probable cause with the trial court, seeking a stay of the sentence pending appeal. The 
application was denied (R. 141-128; 203:34-35). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal 
(R. 143). He also filed an application for a certificate of probable cause with this Court, 
which was also denied. See Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeal, 2005 UT 18, ^ f 1, 110 
P.3d 706. Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the Utah 
Supreme Court, asking it to direct this Court, pursuant to rule 27(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to hold an oral hearing on his probable cause motion (R. 193). Perez-
Llamas, 2005 UT 18, Tf 6. The petition was denied. Id. at f^ 15. 
2
 The judgment and sentence appear to be inaccurately stated given the offense 
defendant pleaded guilty to. The judgment states that defendant was sentenced on a 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony (R. 147). The sentencing proceedings reflect the same offense with the 
same level of punishment (R. 203:18). Possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) 
with intent to distribute, without any aggravating circumstance, is a third degree felony. 
See section 58-37-8 (l)(a)(iii), -(l)(b)(ii). The guilty plea, however, clearly reflects that 
defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
in the presence of a person under 18 (R202:3, 13). That offense is a second degree 
felony. See section 58-37-8 (4)(a)(x), -(4)(c). Given defendant's plea, the lack of 
anything in the record to indicate that the trial court, defendant, and the prosecutor 
discussed a modification of the judgment and sentence, and the apparent intent to 
sentence defendant on a second, rather than third, degree felony, this Court might 
consider a remand to conform the judgment to the intent of the parties if defendant's 
conviction is upheld. See State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988) ("clerical 
errors . . . may be corrected at any time"). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
Traffic violation 
On October 14, 2003, Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol saw the van 
defendant was riding in traveling in the left lane of I-15. Sergeant Mangelson also saw three 
cars pass the van in the right lane. Because the driver of the van failed to pull into the right 
lane to allow the cars to pass, Sergeant Mangelson stopped the van for a left-lane violation 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, "Findings," and "Conclusions," R73-69, 
at 73; 200:7-8, 23-24; 201:11, 54).4 The driver of the van, Reuben Zepeda was cited for 
impeding the left lane, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-55 (West 2004), for which he 
paid a $150 fine, and driving without a license (R. 201:72, 74-75). 
Shrink-wrapped tires 
When the van stopped, Sergeant Mangelson approached the passenger side of the 
vehicle (R. 72; 200:8; 201:12). As he did so, he noticed that the van had a temporary Nevada 
license plate attached with brown tape (R. 200:35; 201:12). Sergeant Mangelson knew that 
smugglers often purchase new cars to "haul a load of dope" (R. 200:35; 201:12). Sergeant 
Mangelson also observed two large implement tires that "obviously did not belong to the 
van" lying in the back of the van (R.72; 200:9-10; 201:13-14). The two tires were shrink-
3
 The facts are recited in the "'light most favorable to the trial court's findings 
from the suppression hearing.'" State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 2, 51 P.3d 55 
(quoting State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App 1997)). 
4
 On direct examination, Zepeda, the driver, denied that any cars passed him, but 
on cross examination he admitted that it was possible that cars could have passed him 
without his noticing (R. 201:55, 63). 
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wrapped which, to the trained officer, "stood out like a neon light," signaling the possibility 
that defendant was transporting drugs (R. 63, 72; 200:9-10; 201:14, 49). Sergeant 
Mangelson also saw a roll of shrink wrap and a "piece of cardboard with dried spray foam 
on it in a circular pattern that appeared to match the circumference of the tire [rims]" (R. 63, 
72; 200:11; 201:15, 17-18). 
Based on his training, Sergeant Mangelson knew that drug smugglers often package 
drugs in shrink wrap or spray them with liquid foam to conceal their odor (R. 63,72; 200:36; 
201:14-15). In fact, "every time he ha[d] seen dried spray foam in a vehicle he ha[d] also 
found illegal narcotics concealed with spray foam" (R. 63; 201:18). On numerous occasions, 
Sergeant Mangelson had discovered drugs in tires that did not fit the vehicle they were in (R. 
72; 200:10; 201:10). Based on his "37 years of experience in drug interdiction and the 
observations he made in this case he was highly suspicious that the occupants of the van were 
trafficking illegal narcotics" (R. 63, 72; 201:19). 
"How about looking at it, do you mind if I look at it?" 
With this suspicion in mind, Sergeant Mangelson asked Zepeda for his driver's license 
and registration (R. 72; 200:8; 201:16). Zepeda, who was 17 years old, admitted that he only 
had a training permit and gave the officer his Las Vegas high school identification (R. 72-71; 
200:8; 201:16; 204:42:06). Zepeda also stated that the van belonged to defendant, who was 
in the passenger seat (R. 72; 200:8; 201:16). Sergeant Mangelson questioned the two about 
where they were going (R. 71; 200:9). Zepeda claimed they were traveling to West Valley 
to look for work (R. 71; 200:9,11; 201:16). This response made Sergeant Mangelson more 
5 
suspicious because "the young man should have been in school" and neither defendant nor 
Zepeda had any luggage for a "long trip away from home" (R. 63, 71; 200:9; 201:19). 
Sergeant Mangelson questioned the two men about the tires (R. 63, 71; 200:11; 
201:17). Defendant spoke little English and Zepeda interpreted (R. 65; 71; 200:11). Neither 
man could explain why the tires were in the van (R. 63; 200:11; 201:20). Sergeant 
Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires: "How about looking at it, do you mind if I look 
at it?" (R. 71; 200:12; 201:20; 204:42:36-38 ). In response, the two men got out of the 
vehicle, and defendant voluntarily opened the back door of the van (R. 71; 201:20; 
204:42:46-55). Defendant later testified that by opening the back door, he was giving 
Sergeant Mangelson permission to look at the tires (R. 71; 201:67). 
Sergeant Mangelson examined the tires (R. 200:12; 201:20). He pulled on one of the 
tires and noticed that it was heavy: "[Y]ou could hit your hand on them . . . and it was like 
they were full of concrete. They were solid. There was no give to them whatsoever" (R. 
200:12; 201:20). Sergeant Mangelson went back to his car to retrieve a stethoscope, in order 
to perform an echo test on the tires (R. 65; 200:14-15; 201:21-22). As he did, defendant 
began closing the van's doors (R. 65; 201:3 8,66). The officer yelled to keep the doors open, 
returned with the stethoscope, and performed the echo test, which indicated that the tires 
were solidly packed with something (R. 65; 200:15; 201:22). The officer cut a slit in the 
shrink wrap and found particles of foam around the tire rim (R. 201:22). During this time, 
Sergeant Mangelson noticed a "marked change in the demeanor of the individuals. They 
obviously knew what I was thinking. They were whispering to one another and kicking holes 
6 
in the dirt on the road. . . [a]s soon as I started concentrating on these tires" (R. 201:24-25). 
As he examined the tires, Sergeant Mangelson continued to question the pair about 
the tires (R. 65; 200:11; 201:17). This caught Zepeda off guard, "[h]e didn't know exactly 
what to say" (R. 201:17). He claimed that the tires were for work (R. 200:11; 201:17). 
Sergeant Mangelson followed up, "Well, how do you use these tires for work?" (R. 201:17). 
However, Zepeda "basically just didn't have an answer for why they had the[] tires" (R. 
201:17). 
Almost 40 pounds of marijuana 
At this point, concerned for his safety, Sergeant Mangelson decided to have the pair 
accompany him to the police station in Nephi (R. 200:16-17; 201:25). Zepeda rode with 
Sergeant Mangleson and defendant followed them in the van (R. 200:16; 201:25). When 
they arrived at the station, Sergeant Mangelson directed a few other officers to examine the 
tires (R. 200:17). Defendant and Zepeda were then placed in a holding cell while Sergeant 
Mangelson took the tires to a tire shop to have them opened up (R. 200:17; 201:26). 
Sergeant Mangelson "discovered approximately 40 pounds of marijuana concealed inside the 
tires" (R. 71; 200:17 201:27). Sergeant Mangelson acknowledged that he did not obtain a 
warrant to search the car (R. 201:45). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the officer's stop of defendant's van was 
justified by an observed traffic violation. The scope of the ensuing detention was almost 
immediately expanded when the officer observed over-sized, shrink wrapped tires, apparently 
7 
treated with spray foam. Based on his substantial experience with illegal drug transport, and 
defendant's and the driver's nervous behavior and suspicious responses to questions, the 
officer quickly developed probable cause to believe that defendant was trafficking in illegal 
drugs. Defendant also voluntarily consented to the officer's searching the tires. During the 
search the officer developed even greater probable cause that the tires contained illicit 
substances. Lastly, because the van was movable and defendant was alerted to the officer's 
presence, exigent circumstances existed to search the tires, both on the roadside and later at 
the station house. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STOP 
WAS JUSTIFIED AT ITS INCEPTION AND THAT THE OFFICER 
QUICKLY DEVELOPED PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
DEFENDANT WAS TRANSPORTING ILLEGAL DRUGS WITHIN 
THE UNIQUELY WRAPPED TIRES; THE SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED 
BY THE EXISTENCE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO A SEARCH OF THE 
TIRES 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed multiple errors in its factual findings 
and in concluding that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution were not violated. Aplt. Br. at 16-28. Specifically, he argues that the stop of 
his van was not genuinely justified by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation (Aplt. Br. 
at 10-16); the scope of the stop was unlawfully extended when Sergeant Mangelson asked 
questions unrelated to the stated purpose of the stop (Aplt. Br. at 16-20); Sergeant Mangelson 
exploited the illegal stop to obtain defendant's involuntary consent, which was limited to 
8 
merely "look[ing] at" the tires (Aplt. Br. at 20-24); defendant revoked his consent when he 
closed the doors of the van (Aplt. Br. at 26); and no exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless search (Aplt. Br. at 26-28). None of these claims has merit. 
A. The initial stop of the van was justified because Sergeant Mangelson 
observed defendant's van impeding the left lane, a violation of Utah law. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "clearly erred in finding that the stop of 
[defendant's van by Sergeant Mangelson was based on reasonable, articulable suspicion," 
because Sergeant Mangelson's "articulated basis for the stop w[as] clearly contradictory and 
. . . incredible." Aplt. Br. at 11. Specifically, defendant claims that because Sergeant 
Mangelson "misstated the reason for the stop" on the video tape, his testimony that he 
stopped the van for a left lane violation "is simply a concoction." Aplt. Br. at 15. 
Defendant's claim fails because the trial court reasonably credited Sergeant Mangelson's 
account of the incident, with which Zepeda's description was substantially consistent. 
It is well established that "[a]s long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating 
any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer 
may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). 
Here, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that "the initial stop of the van 
was justified" because "Sergeant Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion to believe a violation 
of [UTAH CODE ANN.] §41-6-55 [(West 2004)] occurred" (Findings and Conclusions, R. 73-
9 
69, at 70, attached at Addendum B).5 See also Memorandum Decision, R. 66-60, at 64, 
attached at Addendum C. Sergeant Mangelson testified that he stopped defendant's van for 
impeding the left lane (R. 200:8; 201:11). Specifically, Sergeant Mangelson observed 
defendant's van traveling northbound on 1-15. Id. While proceeding in the left lane, 
defendant's van was passed by three cars on the right. Id. Although Zepeda testified that no 
cars passed him while he was driving in the left lane, he also conceded that it was possible 
that he might not have noticed cars passing him (R. 201: 61). And "[defendant concedes 
that if cars were in fact passing the van on the right, Sergeant Mangelson would have been 
justified in effectuating the stop." Aplt. Br. at 14. 
In support of his claim that Sergeant Mangelson "concocted" his story that he stopped 
defendant for left-lane violation, defendant cites a portion of the video tape of the traffic stop 
where Sergeant Mangelson said "'you're going too fast.'" Aplt. Br. at 15 (quoting R. 
5
 Section 41-6-55 provides: 
(2) On a highway having more than one lane in the same direction, the 
operator of a vehicle traveling in the left general purpose lane: 
(a) shall, upon being overtaken by another vehicle in the same 
lane, yield to the overtaking vehicle by moving safely to a 
lane to the right; and 
(b) may not impede the movement or free flow of traffic in 
the left general purpose lane. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 (West 2004). 
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204:4048). Defendant, however, takes this comment out of context. Immediately after 
telling Zepeda that he was going too fast, Sergeant Mangelson stated, "You're in the inside 
lane and you need to move over when somebody comes out." (R. 204:4053-4055). In short, 
the officer apparently misstated himself and then immediately corrected himself. 
Significantly, Zepeda was cited for the left-lane violation and paid the $150.00 fine (R. 
201:74-75). 
Further, Zepeda's description of his driving encounter with Sergeant Mangelson 
partially accords with the officer's rendition. Zepeda testified that he first became aware of 
the officer's car when it approached him from behind as he (Zepeda) was driving on the left 
side of the highway (R. 201:54,61). Although the trial court recognized a discrepancy in the 
testimony about whether Zepeda had been passed by three cars as he drove in the left lane, 
the trial court credited Sergeant Mangelson's testimony that the van failed to pull to the right 
to allow the three cars to pass, a violation of section 41-4-55 (R. 64, 70, 73; 200:8; 201:11). 
See Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153,1158 (Utah 1996) (noting that because trial courts are 
"in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole," appellate courts grant broad discretion to trial courts on such 
matters). In sum, defendant has failed to show that the court did not properly find and 
conclude that the stop was justified where the officer personally observed a traffic violation 
(R. 64, 70, 73). 
11 
B. Based on observations made immediately upon viewing the interior 
of the van, the officer developed not only reasonable suspicion, but 
probable cause to believe defendant was trafficking in drugs. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in finding that the scope of the stop was 
not unconstitutionally extended when Sergeant Mangelson asked questions unrelated to the 
stated purpose of the stop." Aplt. Br. at 16. Specifically, defendant argues that "all questions 
Sergeant Mangelson asked [defendant and Zepeda], except the first two relating to driver's 
license and registration, were questions that improperly expanded the scope to a level three 
encounter[,]" because Sergeant Mangelson did not have reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to believe that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Aplt. Br. at 18, 20). 
Defendant's claim is meritless. 
1. Reasonable suspicion. 
"[D]uring a traffic stop an officer 'may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
\ 31, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132). "Once the purpose of the initial stop 
is concluded, however, the person must be allowed to depart." Id. "Any further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after fulfilling the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion 
of a further illegality" Id. (internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
"If the officer reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity, 'the scope of the 
stop is still limited.'" State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, \ 10, 994 P.2d 1278 (citation 
12 
omitted). "The officer must 'diligently pursuef] a means of investigation that [is] likely to 
confirm or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain 
the defendant.'"/;/, (quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
The Court need not belabor whether the facts, discussed below, show that Sergeant 
Mangelson reasonably suspected defendant of more serious criminal activity almost 
immediately into his initial investigation. They do. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 
(Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts suggesting that 
the individual may be involved in criminal activity") (emphasis added). More importantly, 
as the trial court concluded, those facts actually demonstrated probable cause (R. 63-62; 70). 
2. Probable cause. 
"The determination of whether probable cause exists" for a warrantless search of an 
automobile, as here, "depends upon an examination of all the information available to the 
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search was 
made." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) 
(probable cause is "a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to the seizing 
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure 
and destruction"). It is "a flexible, common-sense standard[,]" and "merely requires that the 
facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,' . . . 
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime[.]" 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162). "[I]t does not 
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demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Id. Rather, 
"[a] 'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that 
is required." Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). In other words, "[t]he process" of 
calculating probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Id 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Just as "practical people 
formulate[] certain common-sense c onclusions about human behavior," so may "law 
enforcement officers." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, evidence 
pointing to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search "must be seen and weighed not 
in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Accordingly, the probable cause standard also recognizes that "[p]olice officers by 
virtue of their experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity where 
ordinary citizens would not." Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. Therefore, "[s]ome recognition 
should appropriately be given to that experience and training where there are objective facts 
to justify the ultimate conclusion." Id. (citations omitted). See United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (recognizing law enforcement officers are allowed "to draw on their 
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person") 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 
If 17, 111 P.3d 808 (recognizing validity of probable cause determination is made from 
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objective standpoint of reasonable officer, including his experience and training) (citation 
and quotation omitted). 
3. The facts support probable cause. 
Here, the trial court found that Sergeant Mangelson's observations as he investigated 
the initial purpose of the stop not only reached the "level of reasonable articulable suspicion," 
but also established "probable cause of [further] criminal activity" (R. 63). After Sergeant 
Mangelson stopped the van and approached its passenger side, he noticed two large 
implement tires, one on seat, the other on the floor toward the rear of the van (R 63; 
204:43:08-50). Based on their oversize, the tires obviously did not belong to the van (R. 63, 
72; 200:9-10; 201:13-15,20). The tires, which were shrink wrapped, "stood out like aneon 
light," immediately suggesting to the officer that they contained illegal drugs. Id. As he 
asked Zepeda for his driver's license and car registration, Sergeant Mangelson observed a 
roll of shrink wrap and a piece of cardboard that had dried spray foam on it in a circular 
pattern, which closely matched the size of the shrink-wrapped tires (R63, 72, 201:15, 17). 
Sergeant Mangelson testified that, it is very common for smugglers to conceal drugs in tires 
(R. 201:11, 15). And whenever Sergeant Mangelson had seen foam used in vehicles, it was 
used to hide drugs (R. 63, 72; 201:18). Based on his 37 years of experience in drug 
interdiction, Sergeant Mangelson was highly suspicious that the tires contained drugs 
because smugglers wrap drugs in shrink wrap and spray them with liquid foam in order to 
conceal their odor from officers and police dogs (R. 63, 72; 201:6, 14-15, 17-18). Adding 
to Sergeant Mangelson's suspicions was that the van was traveling on a known drug route 
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from a known drug source (R. 63, 71; 201:19). The videotape shows that Sergeant 
Mangelson made these observations in a little more than two minutes into the stop while he 
questioned defendant and Zepeda about their identification. (R204:40:18-42:36). In fact, 
Sergeant Mangelson believed the tires contained drugs "when [he] first seen them" (R 63 -62, 
72; 201:39). 
Even though at this point he had probable cause to believe that defendant and Zepeda 
were transporting illegal drugs, Sergeant Mangelson, out of an abundance of caution, "sought 
to confirm or dispel his suspicion by asking where [defendant and Zepeda] were going and 
what the tires were for" (R. 63; 200:9; 16-17). Zepeda, a 17-year-old high school student 
from Las Vegas, stated that they were going to West Valley for work (R. 63, 71; 201:16). 
Sergeant Mangelson thought that it was highly suspicious that a 17-year-old high school 
student was traveling from Las Vegas to West Valley for work when school was in session. 
(R. 201:19). He also noticed that the two men had hardly any luggage for such a long trip. 
(R. 63; 201:19). Additionally, neither defendant nor Zepeda could explain what the tires 
were for. (R. 63; 201:17). 
"All of these factors," the trial court found, "combined to establish Sergeant 
Mangelson's extremely strong suspicion and established a high probability that illegal drugs 
were hidden inside of the tires." (R. 63-63). Case law supports the court's conclusion. In 
Texas v. Brown, an officer stopped Brown at a checkpoint. Brown, 460 U.S. at 733. As he 
asked for Brown's identification, the officer saw Brown drop a party balloon, knotted about 
one-half inch from the tip. Id. When Brown opened the glove compartment, the officer saw 
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that it contained several small plastic vials, some loose white powder, and an open bag of 
party balloons. Id. at 734. Based on his experience that narcotics were frequently packaged 
in small balloons, the officer seized the dropped balloon, which was later found to contain 
heroin. Id. at 734-35. Noting that the process of determining probable cause "is a flexible, 
common sense standard . . . [that] "merely requires that the facts available to the officer 
would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief . . . that certain items may be 
contraband," the Supreme Court held that "it is plain that [the officer] possessed probable 
cause to believe the balloon in Brown's hand contained an illicit substance." Id. at 742 
(citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162) (emphasis added). The Court further noted that "[t]he fact 
that [the officer] could not see through the opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: 
the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents—particularly 
to the trained eye of the officer. Id. at 743. See also People v. Hilt, 698 N.E.2d 233,235-36 
(111. Ct. App. 1998) (distinctively knotted, torn baggie, signaling to experienced officer 
characteristic packaging of crack cocaine, seen in car stopped in early morning hours in area 
known for drug dealing, established probable cause to search); State v. Miles, 775 P.2d 758, 
760-61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (plain view exception justified seizure from automobile of 
small wooden box whose incriminating nature was immediately apparent where its size and 
markings indicated that it contained pipe and marijuana). 
Here, defendant had designed two unique and distinctive packages to contain drugs. 
The packages were also rigorously constructed of materials known and used in the illegal 
narcotics trade to prevent the escape of any odor associated with their contents. To the 
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experienced investigator the specialized, excessive treatment applied to these otherwise 
commonplace objects readily betrayed their illicit character and announced that defendant 
was not using them as they were plainly intended to be used. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 746 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried 
in uninflated, tied-off balloons such as the one . . . seized.") In sum, the trial court correctly 
concluded that "[w]hile Sergeant Mangelson was obtaining information related to the initial 
purpose of the stop he developed probable cause to believe the occupants of the van were 
smuggling illegal narcotics" (R70). The court also correctly concluded that "[a]t this point, 
based on the probable cause that Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope of the stop 
expanded from a simple traffic stop to a situation of narcotics trafficking" (R.62). Thus, the 
trial court concluded that "[i]n order to confirm or dismiss his suspicion Sergeant Mangelson 
asked [defendant and Zepeda] if they would allow him to have a closer look at the tires (R. 
62). 
As stated below, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search if he has probable 
cause that a vehicle contains illegal substances and exigent circumstances justify the search. 
See Aple. Br. at E. Because those criteria existed here, the officer had a legal right to search 
defendant's van, even if he did not have defendant's consent. Nevertheless, the officer's 
search of the tires was independently justified by defendant's voluntary consent. 
C. Defendant's consent to a search of the tires was voluntary and 
was not obtained through exploitation of any police illegality. 
Defendant claims that "[e]ven assuming that Sergeant Mangelson was grounded in 
reasonable suspicion" to detain defendant in order to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the 
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tires contained drugs, defendant's consent that Sergeant Mangelson look at the tires was 
"coerced and/or involuntary." Aplt. Br. at 20-21. 
"A consent is valid only if' (1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent 
was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 125, If 47 
(quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)). It is undisputed that 
defendant gave Sergeant Mangelson his consent to "look" at the tires (R. 62; 201:65; 
204:42:46-55). And because, as established above, Sergeant Mangelson was justified in 
further detaining defendant in order to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the tires contained 
drugs, the only remaining issue is whether defendant's consent was voluntary. 
To be voluntary, consent must be obtained without "duress or coercion, express or 
implied." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT99,Tf47,37P.3d 1073. Factors relevant to determining 
whether the consent was voluntarily given are: "1) the absence of a claim of authority to 
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of 
deception or trick on the part of the officer." Id. (citations omitted) (alternation in original). 
Applying these factors under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly 
concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary. As the court noted, the videotape is the 
most probative evidence of defendant's voluntary consent and that there was no show of 
force: "Sergeant Mangelson was alone at the time of the request to search, he did not have 
his hand on his sidearm, his voice was calm and even, in short, nothing in Sergeant 
Mangelson's demeanor could have been construed as a show of force" (R. 61; 204:40:18-
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44:23). The videotape reveals that Sergeant Mangelson merely asked if he could examine 
the tires: "How about lookin' at [the tires]? Do youmind if I look at it?" (R. 204:42:36-38). 
In response to that request, defendant promptly exited the van and opened the back doors (R. 
204:42:46-55). Defendant himself testified that by opening the van door, he was giving 
Sergeant Mangelson consent (R. 201:65). He also acknowledged that Sergeant Mangelson 
never threatened him if he did not allow him to search, that the officer never claimed a legal 
right to search, and that he never showed any force to persuade him to open the van (R. 
201:70-71). Only when defendant began to close the doors and Sergeant Mangelson told him 
in a loud voice to open them up did he assert that the officer showed any force (R. 201:71). 
In the absence of any showing that Sergeant Mangelson exercised duress or coercion, the trial 
court correctly concluded that defendant's consent to search the tires was voluntary. 
D. Defendant consented to a physical examination of the tires. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that "defendant consented to the 
search by allowing Sergeant Mangelson to look at the tires." Aplt. Br. at 23. Particularly, 
defendant argues that consent to "look" at the tires did not encompass consent to physically 
examine them. Because defendant's consent to "look" at the tires reasonably included 
handling them, defendant's claim fails.6 
6
 Defendant also argues that he revoked his consent when he attempted to shut the 
back door of the van. Aplt. Br. at 24. Defendant admits, however, that he closed the door 
only because he thought that Sergeant Mangelson "had already finished" looking at the 
tires. (R. 201:66). This admission negates his argument that he was affirmatively 
withdrawing his former consent. See State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 736 (recognizing 
that consent is judged by an objective reasonableness standard). 
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"'The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of "objective" reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?'5' State v. 
Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
251 (1991)). "Although a suspect may limit the scope of consent, if the officer could 
reasonably understand the consent to extend to a particular container, 'the Fourth 
Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.'" State v. 
Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). 
In Stephens, a police officer, while making a traffic stop, observed Stephens make 
several "'stuffing' movements toward the passenger side of the front seat." Id. at 735. The 
officer asked Stephens if he had hidden any drugs or weapons under the seat. Id. Stephens 
replied, "No, you're free to look if you want." Id. (emphasis added). The officer explained 
to Stephens that because of what he observed, he would "like to ' check' under the front seat." 
Id. Stephens replied, "Go right ahead." Id. The officer discovered a leather case under the 
front seat that contained drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. Stephens sought to suppress the 
drugs, arguing that permission to "look" or "check" under the seat did not allow the officer 
to search the contents of the leather case. Id. 
The Stephens court framed the question as whether, "defendant's authorization to 
'look' and [the officer's] failure to ask permission to specifically 'search,' effectively 
excluded the contents of the leather case from the scope of defendant's consent." Id. at 736. 
The Court began its analysis by noting that under Jimeno, it "need not consider the limiting 
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effect that defendant may have subjectively attached both to his own use of the word 'look' 
and [the officer's] request to 'check' under the front seat." Id. After considering the 
circumstances of the encounter, the court concluded that Stephen's "general consent to 'look' 
or 'check' under the front seat for weapons or drugs extended to the contents of the leather 
case." Id. One fact that the court found particularly telling was that Stephens "did not place 
any limits on the scope of his consent." Id. at 737. 
In support of its holding, the Stephens court cited Untied States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 
684, 688 (5th Cir. 1995), which stated that an officer's request to look in a vehicle is 
"effectively" asking for permission to search. See also United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 
484 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding "that an individual's consent to an officer's request to 'look 
inside' his vehicle is equivalent to general consent to search the vehicle and its contents"). 
Here, Sergeant Mangelson asked defendant if he could look at the tires in the back of 
the van. In response, defendant got out of the passenger's seat and opened the back door. 
Thereafter, Sergeant Mangelson physically handled the tires. Defendant did not object to this 
behavior nor seek to clarify the limits to his consent. Indeed, defendant's demeanor during 
the officer's examination of the tires suggests that he readily acquiesced in the search (R. 
204:42:46-44:50). Therefore, under the objective reasonableness standard, Sergeant 
Mangelson stayed within the scope of defendant's consent. 
As a result of defendant's consent to search, Sergeant Mangelson also developed 
further probable cause that the tires contained illegal substances. The tires felt solid, like 
"concrete," heavy, and totally incompressible (R. 200:12; 201:20). The "echo" test, 
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performed with a stethoscope, revealed that the tires were solid (R. 65; 200:15; 201:22). 
Cutting away a little bit of the shrink wrap, the officer found particles of foam around the tire 
rim (R. 201:22). During this time, defendant and Zepeda began to act uncomfortably and 
were unable to adequately answer Sergeant Mangelson's questions about the tires. All of 
these facts only made the officer more certain that there was contraband in the tires: "[I]f you 
figure probable cause is 51 percent, I think I'm probably at 95 percent at this point that 
there's drugs in those tires" (R. 201:26). 
E. No separate exigency requirement applies to 
a search of an automobile stopped on the highway. 
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in failing to analyze whether exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless search of the van." Aplt. Br. at 26.7 More 
particularly, defendant argues that because the van "was not movable and [Zepeda and 
defendant] were both arrested," "exigent circumstances did not exist" when the tires were 
finally opened. Aplt. Br. at 28. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the United States Constitution. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This rule, however, is "subject... to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. One such 
exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 
7
 Based on the evidence that exigent circumstances existed in the circumstances of 
this stop, any argument that the trial court failed to make explicit findings need not be 
considered. "In cases where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a ruling, 
this court will uphold it even where the trial court fails to make explicit factual findings." 
State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, \ 7, 984 P.2d 975 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
787-88 (Utah 1991)). 
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(1925). "A warrantless search is permissible under the automobile exception if (1) the 
officer conducting the search had probable cause to believe that the vehicle in question 
contained] property that the government may properly seize; and (2) exigent circumstances 
justified the search." United States v. Castelo, 415 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted). 
"Under Utah law '[ejxigent circumstances exist when the car is movable, the 
occupants are alerted [to the presence of law enforcement], and the car's contents may never 
be found again if a warrant must be obtained.'" State v. Parr a, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996)). See also 
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 
(1996). 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a warrantless station house search of a 
vehicle after an earlier roadside search which was held to be justified by exigent 
circumstances at the initial stop. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1238-38. The court noted that 
"exigent circumstances are to be weighed only at the time the vehicle is seized by police." 
Id. at 1237 (citing with approval Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) and Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). The court went on to state that "[i]n these cases, the 
[United States Supreme] Court reasoned that because the police could have searched the 
vehicle immediately after the arrest, 'there is little to choose in terms of practical 
consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization 
until a warrant is obtained.'" Id. at 1238. (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52, and White, 423 
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U.S. at 68). "Thus, as long as police had probable cause to search and exigent circumstances 
existed at the time the automobile was stopped and seized, a warrantless search conducted 
sometime later at a secure location would not offend the Fourth Amendment." Id. See 
Parra, 972 P.2d at 926 (upholding later warrantless search at a secure location even though 
Parra had been placed in custody where Parra's vehicle was "movable" at the time the police 
officer pulled him over); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(holding automobile exception applicable even though defendant was arrested and officer 
had keys to his vehicle, because such circumstances "do not make [the vehicle] less mobile"). 
Anderson, Parra, and Gallman are dispositive of this case. It is undisputed that 
defendant was alerted to the presence of a police officer and that defendant's van was mobile 
when Sergeant Mangelson pulled it over. Further, the van's contents "[might] never [have 
be[en] found again if a warrant [had to] be obtained." Parra, 972 P.2d at 926 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, exigent circumstances existed. In 
addition, because "[Sergeant Mangelson] had probable cause to search and exigent 
circumstances existed at the time [defendant's van] was stopped and seized, [the] 
warrantless search conducted sometime later at [the Highway Patrol Station, which resulted 
in the discovery of almost 40 pounds of marijuana, did] not offend the Fourth Amendment." 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
In sum, probable cause and exigent circumstances justified not only the search of the 
tires when defendant's van was initially stopped, but also when it was later taken to the 
station house and then to a shop where the tires were opened. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A m e n d m e n t IV . Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 5 5 . Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction 
(1) On any highway: 
(a) the operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction: 
(i) shall, except as provided under Section 41-6-56, pass to the left at a 
safe distance; and 
(ii) may not drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the 
overtaken vehicle; 
(b) the operator of an overtaken vehicle: 
(i) shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle; and 
(ii) may not increase the speed of the vehicle until completely passed by 
the overtaking vehicle. 
(2) On a highway having more than one lane in the same direction, the 
operator of a vehicle traveling in a left general purpose lane: 
(a) shall, upon being overtaken by another vehicle in the same lane, yield 
to the overtaking vehicle by moving safely to a lane to the right; and 
(b) may not impede the movement or free flow of traffic in a left general 
purpose lane or except: 
(i) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction in accordance with Subsection (l)(a); 
(ii) when preparing to turn left or taking a highway split or exit on the 
left; 
(iii) when responding to emergency conditions; 
(iv) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving onto the highway from an 
acceleration or merging lane; or 
(v) when following direction signs that direct use of a designated lane. 
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 45; Laws 1983, c. 337, § 3; Laws 1985, c. 194, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 
138, § 54; Laws 2002, c. 74, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. 
Codifications C. 1943, § 57-7-122. 
UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
§ 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 . Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distrib-
ute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which 
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 
37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with 
respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, 
or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of 
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, 
the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may addition-
ally sentence the person Jconvicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was ob-
tained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; 
or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), includ-
ing less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsec-
tion (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as 
listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(li) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanoi; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in 
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negli-
gent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 
or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufactur-
er, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense 
to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresen-
tation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alter-
ation of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not author-
ized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under 
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon convic-
tion subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if 
the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution 
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure 
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if thg 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encour-
ages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsec-
tion (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the 
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manu-
factures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as 
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope 
of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall 
be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUIS PEREZ LLAMAS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 031600159 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
The defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, through his attorney, Joseph Jardine and the State of 
Utah though, Jared Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, submitted memorandums and oral argument 
to this Court. After considering the arguments of the attorneys and all relevant memoranda, this 
Court now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 14, 2003 Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol observed the van 
the defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, was riding in driving in the left lane of 1-15. Sergeant 
Mangelson also observed three cars pass the van hi the right lane of 1-15. Due to the van's 
failure to pull to the right to allow the cars to pass, Sergeant Mangelson stopped the van 
for a left lane violation. 
2. Upon stopping the van, Sergeant Mangelson approached the passenger side of vehicle. As 
Sergeant Mangelson approached the left side of the van, he observed two tires lying in the 
back of the van. Sergeant Mangelson also noticed that the tires were too big for the van 
and obviously did not belong to the van. Additionally, Sergeant Mangelson noticed that 
the tires were wrapped in shrinkwrap. 
3. When Sergeant Mangelson requested the driver's license and registration, the driver 
produced a high school identification card and said that he only had a permit to drive, not 
a license. 
4. The defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, was riding in the passenger seat. 
5. About the time Sergeant Mangelson initiated conversation with the driver, he noticed a 
roll of shrinkwrap, which led him to believe the occupants of the van had wrapped the 
tires to conceal the odor of illegal narcotics. Additionally, Sergeant Mangelson observed a 
piece of cardboard with dried spray foam on it in a circular pattern that appeared to match 
the circumference of the tires.. 
6. In Sergeant Mangelson's 37 years of experience in drug interdiction he has seen on many 
occasions drugs concealed inside of tires. 
7. Every time Sergeant Mangelson has seen dried spray foam in a vehicle he has also found 
illegal narcotics concealed with spray foam. 
8. The observations Sergeant Mangelson made, caused him to be highly suspicious that the 
occupants of the van were trafficking illegal narcotics. 
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9. After examining the driver's identification, which was from Desert Pines High School in 
Las Vegas, Nevada, Sergeant Mangelson began questioning the occupants of the van 
about the items he had observed in the back of the van. 
10. The driver answered some of Sergeant Mangelson's questions and Mr. Perez Llamas, 
who speaks very little English, responded to some of Sergeant Mangelson's questions 
through the driver, who acted as an interpreter. 
11. Sergeant Mangelson asked the occupants where they were going and what the tires were 
for. The driver of the vehicle responded by saying they were coming from Las Vegas and 
going to West Valley for work. 
12. Sergeant Mangelson thought the story of a 17 year old going to West Valley for work was 
suspicious because he should have been in school. 
13. Sergeant Mangelson also observed the lack of luggage which he thought was strange for 
people who were a long way from home looking for work. 
14. Sergeant Mangelson also considered that 1-15 is a known drug corridor and that Las 
Vegas is a source city for illegal drugs. 
15. Sergeant Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires in the back of the van. Mr. Perez 
Llamas responded to this question by getting out of the van and opening the back doors of 
the van. Mr. Perez Llamas agreed that he gave Sergeant Mangelson permission to look at 
the tires. 
16. Ultimately, Sergeant Mangelson discovered approximately 40 pounds of marijuana 
concealed inside of the tires. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sergeant Mangelson had reasonable suspicion to believe a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-55 
occurred. Therefore, the initial stop of the van was justified at its inception. 
2. While Sergeant Mangelson was obtaining information related to the initial purpose of the 
stop he developed probable cause to believe the occupants of the van were smuggling 
illegal narcotics. 
3. Based on the probable cause that Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope of the stop 
expanded from a simple traffic stop to a situation involving narcotics trafficking. 
4. Even though Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to search the tires and could have 
inspected them even over the objection of the occupants, he sought to obtain additional 
justification for a search by asking for consent. 
5. This Court finds that Mr. Perez Llamas consented to allow Sergeant Mangelson to look at 
the tires. 
6. Additionally, after considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Perez Llamas' consent for Sergeant Mangelson 
to look at the tires was without coercion or duress and was given voluntarily. 
7. This Court finds that the stop and eventual search of the minivan in this case were 
reasonable according to both the United States and Utah Constitutional requirements. 
8. Furthermore, this Court finds that the search of the tires in this case was constitutionally 
reasonable. 
4 
ORDER 
IT IS NOW THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
marijuana discovered inside of the tires in this case is denied. 
DATED this /f day of July, 2004. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STA TAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUIS PEREZ-LLAMAS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 031600159 
Date. May 5, 2004 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda now r • he following n lling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 14, 2003, Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway patrol stopped a van for 
an alleged left lane violation. Sergeant Mangelson testified at the preliminary hearing that 
he observed three cars pass the van on the right. 11 P. 8, L. 6. 
2. Sergeant Mangelson initiated : :.. ait and signaled the van to pull over. Upon stopping, 
Mangelson approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson testified, 
"As I got to the side of the vehicle I noted a couple of tires that were lying in the back of 
the van." Suppression Hearing (hereinafter "SH"), p. 13. Sergeant Mangelson also 
noticed that the tires were too big for the van and obviously did not belong to the van. 
SH, p. 19-20 Additionally, the officer testified *' - ,:res were wrapped in shrinkwrap. 
SH, p. 14. 
3. Sergeant Mangelson asked for a driver's license and registration. The driver produced a 
high school identification and said that he only had a permit to drive, not a license. The 
passenger, Luis Perez-Llamas was riding in the passenger seat. 
4. After examining the driver's ID., but before returning it, Mangelson began questioning 
the occupants of the van regarding some packaging that he saw in the back of the van. 
Defendant speaks very little English, and most of the responses were either by the driver, 
or through him acting as an interpreter. The driver responded that there were some tires 
in the back of the van. Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires. In response to his 
request Defendant got out of the car and opened the back door of the van. 
5. Mangelson proceeded to examine the tires and continued his questioning of the occupants. 
After Mangelson looked at the tires, he returned to his cruiser. Defendant then closed the 
back doors of the van. Mangelson then told the Defendant to keep the doors open. 
Defendant then opened the doors. Mangelson returned with a stethoscope. He ordered 
Defendant and the driver to the shoulder of the road while he performed an echo test of 
the tire. 
6. After that, Mangelson ordered the driver to get into his cruiser and told Defendant to get 
in the van and follow him to the police station. About 15 minutes later they arrived at the 
station. Other officers were called on the scene and began searching the van. There was 
some discussion regarding the tires. The air pressure of the tires was taken. Eventually it 
was decided to arrest the driver and defendant. After they were arrested, Mangelson took 
the tires down to a local tire shop to have them "broken down." Upon removing the tires 
from the rims, contraband was uncovered. No warrant was sought to search the van or 
the tires. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
I. The Search of the Vehicle Following the Initial Stop did not Violate the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." It is important to note, "what the 
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures but unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (internal citation omitted). 
1. The stop was justified because a violation of Utah law occurred in Sergeant 
Mangelson's presence. 
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In evaluating whether or not a search and seizure performed at a traffic stop is 
constitutionally reasonable the Court must conduct a two step inquiry. First, was the police 
officer's action justified at its inception, and second, was the resulting detention reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
;:<jjtah 1994). 
Under Utah statutory and case law, "a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping 
a vehicle if the stop is, 'incident to' a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "As long as an officer 
suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations,' the police officer may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Chevre, 2000 III A pp., 6 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127 1132 (IJtah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400.)) 
In this case, Sergeant Mangelson testified that he observed a vehicle driving in the left lane 
on 1-15 and the vehicle failed to move to the right when three other cars came up from behind. 
Sergeant Mangelson further testified that he observed three other cars move to the rigl it lane and 
pass the minivan. PH p. 8. 1 2-8. Failing to move from the left lane when another car comes up 
from behind at a faster rate of speed is a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-55. Mr. Zepeda, however, 
testified that cars did not pass him that day, but that he was doing the passing. SH p. 54. 1 25. 
This Court finds that although there is a dispute in the facts, that Sergeant Mangleson's testimony 
indicates he had a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was taking place. Since Sergeant 
Mangelson observed tllis violation of Utah state law, he was justified to stop the vehicle and 
detain the driver long enough to investigate the suspected violation. The Court finds the first 
prong of the inquiry is satisfied; this traffic stop was justified at its inception. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated, "once the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded . . . the person must be allowed to depart. 'Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fufilling] the purpose for the initial stop1 constitutes an illegal 
seizure, unless the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 % 31 (citations omitted). 
In this case, after Sergeant Mangelson stopped the minivan and as he walked beside the 
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van to talk with the occupants he noticed two large implement tires that obviously did not belong 
to the van that were lying in the back of the van. Sergeant Mangelson noticed that these tires 
were wrapped in shrinkwrap which in his words, "stood out like a neon light to me." (SH p. 49. 
Shortly after noticing the suspicious tires and about the time he initiated conversation with the 
driver of the vehicle, Sergeant Mangelson also noticed a roll of shrinkwrap, which led him to 
believe the occupants of the van had wrapped the tires themselves in order to conceal the odor of 
illegal narcotics and also a piece of cardboard with dried spray foam on it in a circular pattern 
matching the circumference of the tire rims. Sergeant Mangelson has seen on many occasions 
drugs concealed inside of tires, in fact he testified that it is one of the more common methods for 
concealing illegal narcotics. Sergeant Mangelson also testified that every time he has seen dried 
spray foam in a vehicle he has also found illegal narcotics concealed with spray foam. Based on 
Sergeant Mangelson's 37 years of experience in drug interdiction and the observations he made in 
this case he was highly suspicious that the occupants of the van were trafficking illegal narcotics. 
The observations that Sergeant Mangelson initially made meet the level of reasonable 
articulable suspicion and constitute probable cause of criminal activity. However, Sergeant 
Mangelson sought to confirm or dispel his suspicion by asking where the occupants were going 
and what the tires were for. The driver, Reuben Zepeda responded by saying that they were 
headed to West Valley for work and he also provided Sergeant Mangelson a high school ID. card 
from Desert Pines High School in Las Vegas as identification for himself. Sergeant Mangelson 
thought that the story of a 17 year old going to West Valley for work was suspicious because the 
young man should have been in school. Sergeant Mangelson noticed the lack of luggage which he 
thought was strange for people on a long trip away from home to look for work. Additionally, 
the inability of the occupants to explain what the tires were for was very suspicious. Sergeant 
Mangelson also considered that the minivan was traveling a known drug corridor and that it was 
coming from a city, that in his experience, is a source city for illegal narcotics. See State v. Poole, 
871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994) (case involving Serageant Mangelson stating that 1-15 is a known 
trafficking route). 
All of these factors combined to establish Sergeant Mangelson's extremely strong 
suspicion and established a high probability that illegal drugs were hidden inside of the tires. In 
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fact, Sergeant Mangelson testified that as soon as he saw the tires and how they were wrapped 
up, he knew there was something inside of them. SH, p. 39. 
At this point, based on the probable cause that Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope 
of the stop expanded from a simple traffic stop to a situation involving narcotics trafficking. In 
order to confirm or dismiss his suspicion Sergeant Mangelson asked the veupjnts if they v^nuld 
allow him to have a closer look at the tires. The occupants agreed and exited the vehicle, went to 
the back and Mr. Perez Llamas opened the back doors up for Sergeant Mangelson. 
In this case both prongs of the required inquiry have been satisfied, the stop was justified 
at its inception and the detention was reasonably related to the purpose of the stop and the 
articulable suspicion and probable cause developed by Sergeant Mangelson while he was 
obtaining information related to the initial reason for the stop The Court finds that the stop and 
the eventual search of the minivan in this case were reasonable according to both the United 
States and Utah Constitutional requirements. 
2. Sergeant Mangelson obtained consent to look at the tires. 
Even though Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to search the tires and could ha\ e 
inspected them even over the objection of the occupants, he sought to obtain the additional 
justification by asking consent to allow him to look closer at the tires. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen has clarified the examination that should take place in 
order to determine whether consent to search was valid. 2002 UT 125, \ 47. "A consent is valid 
only if c(l) the consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained K police 
exploitation of the pii r^ illegality.'" / f (citation omitted) 
a. Tin consent to search was voluntary. 
The Court must first determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the 
defendant consented to the search before it can address whether the consent was voluntary. Id at 
H48. 
A review of the video tape of the traffic stop reveals that shortly after Sergeant Mangelson 
asked for permission to look at the tires, Mr. Perez Llamas got out of the van, walked to the back 
and opened the doors for him. Mr. Perez Llamas also agreed at the suppression hearing that he 
gave Sergeant Mangelson permission to look at the tires. SH p. 65, 67. 
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Once a factual determination has been made that consent was given, the analysis focuses 
on whether the consent was voluntary. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the analysis of 
voluntariness by stating: 
The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances 
test, and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence. Under the totality of 
the circumstances test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, 
and the characteristics of the defendant. The totality of the circumstances must show 
consent was given without duress or coercion. In other words, a person's will cannot be 
overborne, nor may "his capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired." 
Id. at If 57 (citations omitted). The court then went on to list several factors that may show the 
lack of duress or coercion. These factors are: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to search; 
(4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. Id. 
In considering these factors, the Court finds the most probative evidence is the video tape 
of the stop. A review of the video tape shows that Sergeant Mangelson made no claim of 
authority to look at the tires and in fact Mr. Perez Llamas agreed that Sergeant Mangelson did not 
make any claim of authority. SH, p. 71. 
The video also shows there was no show of force. Sergeant Mangelson was alone at the 
time of the request to search, he did not have his hand on his sidearm, his voice was calm and 
even, in short, nothing in Sergeant Mangelson5s demeanor could have been construed as a show 
of force. Mr. Perez Llamas agreed at the suppression hearing that Sergeant Mangelson was alone 
and that there were no threats or show of force when he requested permission to look at the tires. 
Mr. Perez Llamas did testify that the only think that even came close to a show of force was after 
Sergeant Mangelson first looked at the tires, he walked back to his car momentarily and when he 
did that Mr. Perez Llamas began to close the door but Sergeant Mangelson yelled something to 
the effect of "don't close it." SH, p. 68. 
The video reveals that Sergeant Mangelson merely made a request to search. Sergeant 
Mangelson simply asked if he could take a closer look at the tires. The words he chose, the tone 
of voice he used and his body language only suggest that this was a request to search and not a 
demand or an order. 
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The video also shows that Mr Perez Llamas cooperated with Sergeant Mangelson He 
got out of the van, came to the back and opened the doors so Sergeant Mangelson could inspect 
the suspicious tires Mr Perez Llamas agreed that in fact he did give Sergeant Mangelson 
permission to look at the tires and that he opened the Jo us fi r luin Ml |i 
Lastly, there is no evidence that Sergeant Mangelson used any deception or trickery in 
order to persuade Mr Perez Llamas to consent to the search. 
The totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr Perez Llamas' consent to search do not 
reveal any circumstances that would have overridden his will or interfered with his capacity for 
self-determination Ihe Court finds b> a preponderance of the evidence th it K Ii Pei c' I lama's 
consent to look at the tires w7as without coercion or duress and was given voluntarily Thus, the 
search of the tires was constitutionally reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court denies the defendant's Motion to Suppress and finds the evidence was 
discovered pursuant to a constitutionally reasonable search. The State is to prepare an order 
consistent with this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature 
DATED this C? day of May, 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
STEVEN L HANSEN, JUDGE - \ ' 
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